This text provides a comprehensive and timely examination of the most pertinent factors affecting institutional ethics committees, for ethicists, trustees, administrators, physicians, clergy, nurses, social workers, attorneys and others with an interest in ethics committees.

In recent years physicians have used a variety of laboratory studies as confirmatory tests in the diagnosis of brain death. The most widely used test has been the EEG. However, with the development of newer technologies capable of measuring other parameters of brain functions, other laboratory studies are playing an increasingly important role in confirming brain death. In this article, we discuss the role of one of these newer tests, the radioactive brain scan, and compare its advantages and limitations with (...) the EEG. (shrink)

Discussion of the ethics of forgoing medically provided nutrition and hydration tends to focus on adults rather than infants and children. Many appellate court decisions address the legal propriety of forgoing medically provided nutritional support of adults, but only a few have ruled on pediatric cases that pose the same issue.The cessation of nutritional support is implemented most commonly for patients in a permanent vegetative state ). An estimated 4,000 to 10,000 American children are in the permanent vegetative state, compared (...) to 10,000 to 25,000 adults. Yet the dearth of literature, case reports, and court decisions suggests that physicians and families of pediatric patients stop medically provided nutrition or seek court orders much less frequently. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Russell's external world: 1912-1921 by Ronald E. Nusenoff IN "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics",lOur Knowledge ofthe External World,2 and "The Ultimate Constituents ofMatter",3 Russell presents a phenomenalistic reduction ofphysical objects. On this theory, the external world becomes a physical space of six dimensions, which must be logically constructed by a three-dimensional ordering of three-dimensional phenomenal spaces. In what follows, we will consider Russell's varying views, from causal (...) realism in The Problems of Philosophy,4 through phenomenalism, to neutral monism in The Analysis ofMind,5 on the nature ofthe external world. We will pay particular attention to the relation between physical and phenomenal space, and the status ofthe causal theory ofperception. 1. Realism (1912) In The Problems ofPhilosophy, Russell distinguishes a single "real" space ofscience from the "apparent" spaces ofperception. He begins with various cases of perceptual relativity, illusion, etc., and from these infers that those object which are immediately known to us are not the physical objects which the layman might take them to be. Rather, what are immediately known are sense-data, these being caused by, and so in some sense "corresponding" to, physical obI "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics", Scientia, 4 (1914), reprinted as Chapter VIII of Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (London, 1918). 2 Our Knowledge ofthe External World as a Fieldfor Scientific Method in Philosophy (London, 1914). 3 "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter", Monist, 25 (1915), reprinted as Chapter VII of Mysticism and Logic. 4 The Problems ofPhilosophy (London, 1946 [lst published, 1912]). 5 The Analysis of Mind (London, 1921). 65 66 Russell, nos. 29-32 (1978) jects. Physical objects are located in "one public all-embracing physical space", while "our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space of sight or the space of touch or such vaguer spaces as other senses may give us".6 Through experience, we are able to correlate these various private sense-data spaces (i.e., in so far as we can correlate experiences in one with experiences in another). What Russell does not go on to do here is define physical space in terms of private spaces. Given that (a) Space is relational rather than absolute, and (b) All that we can know about physical objects is that both they and their relations "correspond" to our sense-data and their relations, then (c) "we may assume that there is a physical space in which physical objects have spatial relations corresponding to those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces".7 Our knowledge of physical space is then merely knowledge of relative position, and other features, e.g., shape, are "only supposed to correspond to the physical space so far as is required for the preservation of the order".8 On this view, the existence ofa physical space is necessitated solely by, and so is no more plausible than, the need for physcial objects. Russell's argument for accepting our "instinctive" belief that physical objects exist is less than compelling. Since this belief does not lead to any difficulties, but on the contrary tends to simplify and systemize our account of our experiences, there seems no good reason for rejecting it.9 In what follows, ~e shall see that Russell's phenomenalism is not explainable as differing from the realism found in The Problems of Philosophy merely in the rejection of this "instinctive" belief. II. Phenomenalism (1914-?) In his "Reply to Criticisms" in the Schilpp collection,IO Russell seems to deny that he ever really accepted phenomenalism. 6 The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 30-1 7 Ibid., p. 31. 8 Ibid., p. 33. 9Ibid., p. 24. 10"Reply to Criticisms", in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy ofBertrand Russell (Evanston and Chicago, 1944), pp. 679-741. Russell's external world 67 Mr. Boodin quotes a passage from me according to which it appears that at a certain time I thought only percepts were real. This was a technical hypothesis which I was trying to make logically adequate. II However, only a few pages earlier he had remarked: There are some who would deny that physics need say anything about what cannot... (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to follow a lead of Prof. Stanley Cavell's in his paper, "Kierkegaard's On Authority and Revelation." The lead is: "to understand an utterance religiously you have to be able to share its perspective... The religious is a Kierkegaardian stage of life; and I suggest it should be thought of as a Wittgensteinian form of life." I try to present "form of life" as a larger picture sometimes necessary for understanding language-games, and to suggest that (...) what counts as a form of life will depend upon what particular language-game one is trying to understand. Sometimes then, a person's religious belief might figure into this process as a relevant form of life. I then try to represent Kierkegaard's religious stage by discussing three related concepts: paradox, ideal interpretation, and subjectivity. Paradox is one criterion for marking off the religious stage from the ethical and the aesthetical stages. In the religious stage, the talk of believers about God is such that it interprets the events in one's life according to that belief. In calling this an "ideal interpretation" Kierkegaard is calling our attention to the difference between this and the scientific talk of hypothesis, observation, and evidence. The religious stage is subjectivity—a way of life. In it, the truth of what one says is measured by how one lives in relation to it. This, I suggest, is quite close to Wittgenstein's idea of a form of life being important for understanding the language used within it. My conclusion is that Prof. Cavell's suggestion is a helpful lead in thinking about the connection between Wittgenstein's "form of life" and Kierkegaard's religious stage. (shrink)

I have two aims: to analyze Jonathan Webber’s analysis of bad faith and compare it to my own, traditional, account and to show that Webber’s focus on character, as a set of dispositions or character traits that incline but do not determine us to view the world and behave in certain ways, contributes further to understanding Sartre’s ‘bad faith’. Most Sartre scholars have ignored any emphasis on ‘character’. What is distinctive and emphatic in Webber’s interpretation is his insistence ‘on bad (...) faith’ as a ‘social disease’ distorting the way one views, interprets, and even thinks about the world.. But, again, this pattern is not deterministic. Early in his work, Webber tells us that Sartre does not claim that we have bad faith by ‘ascribing character traits where there are none but by pretending to ourselves that we have ‘fixed natures’ that e.g. preclude the behaviour or character trait of which one is being accused.Though hardly disagreeing radically with Webber I do offer critical considerations. While Webber focuses on character, I focus on Sartre’s contention that the ‘most basic’ or ‘first act’ of bad faith is ‘to flee from what [the human being] cannot flee, from what it is’, specifically human freedom. And I disagree partially with Webber’s articulation of the ‘spirit of seriousness’, and strongly with both Sartre’s and his supporting claim that bad faith cannot be cynical. I also demur from Webber’s overemphasis on the ‘social’. For me, the root of all bad faith is our primitive ontological condition; namely, that at its very ‘upsurge’, human reality, anguished by its ‘reflective apprehension’ of its freedom and lack of Being, is disposed to flee from its nothingness in pursuit of identity, substantiality - in short, Being. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to describe the operation of a four-year prevention and awareness campaign organized by an evangelical social action network that mobilized Brazilian local churches to confront the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents before and during the FIFA 2014 World Cup. The aspects explored in this article are: the birth of the campaign; the manner in which an evangelical network served as a catalyst to mobilize the church to confront sexual violence; and the lessons learned (...) from this experience. It was found that the problem of sexual exploitation of children and adolescents can be addressed through an enlightened and engaged church that accepts the biblical mandate to act with justice and mercy to the “least of the least” in our society: children. The church is a sleeping giant that must be awakened to break the silence of sexual violence and be a strong advocate for vulnerable children. (shrink)

This article addresses the role of social media fragments in the return of fascist politics It argues that beside or contrary to a conscious collective intelligence emerging through the internet, a collective unconscious has seized the political space, delegitimatizing modern institutions of documentary truth based on evidence, method, and the institutional construction of facts.

Although interactions of proteins with glycosaminoglycans (GAGs), such as heparin and heparan sulphate, are of great biological importance, structural requirements for protein‐GAG binding have not been well‐characterised. Ionic interactions are important in promoting protein‐GAG binding. Polyelectrolyte theory suggests that much of the free energy of binding comes from entropically favourable release of cations from GAG chains. Despite their identical charges, arginine residues bind more tightly to GAGs than lysine residues. The spacing of these residues may determine protein‐GAG affinity and specificity. (...) Consensus sequences such as XBBBXXBX, XBBXBX and a critical 20 Å spacing of basic residues are found in some protein sites that bind GAG. A new consensus sequence TXXBXXTBXXXTBB is described, where turns bring basic interacting amino acid residues into proximity. Clearly, protein‐GAG interactions play a prominent role in cell‐cell interaction and cell growth. Pathogens including virus particles might target GAG‐binding sites in envelope proteins leading to infection. BioEssays 20:156–167, 1998. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)